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Abstract
To what extent do social networks shape a person’s vote choice? Using data on political
networks gathered during a novel, multi-wave panel study conducted during the 2010 election
cycle in the UK, we argue that although people may choose to discuss politics more often with
those who hold similar political views, remaining disagreements in political discussion networks
can still have a substantial impact on vote choice. Our study is the Vrst large scale, general
population sample survey to track changes in an individual’s named political discussion partners
over the course of an election campaign, and thus provides a unique opportunity to study the
simultaneous processes of selection and inWuence in campaign-related political discussion. We
use these data to identify two social processes at work during the 9 months prior to the election:
“selection”, or the likelihood that people choose discussion partners based on their political views,
and “inWuence”, the convergence of views between discussion partners. We Vnd limited evidence
that people select like-minded political discussants, but clear support for social inWuence on vote
choice.
1 Introduction
Most people hold political views similar to those of friends and family members. In our research,
survey respondents report that more than 75% of those with whom they discuss politics share the
same partisan preferences, a proportion that cannot be due to chance alone. Nor is this high
level of political agreement particularly surprising, given considerable evidence demonstrates that
friends, family members and coworkers are likely to agree on political matters, including political
partisanship (Jennings and Richard, 1981; Kenny, 1994), vote choice (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee,
1954; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995, 1991; Nieuwbeerta and Flap, 2000; Pattie and Johnston, 2000), and
other political attitudes (Bienenstock, Bonacich and Oliver, 1990; Huckfeldt, Johnson and Sprague,
2004; Huckfeldt, Mendez and Osborn, 2004; Pattie and Johnston, 2000). The question is not whether
people agree, it is why such high levels of agreement exist. More precisely stated, what mechanism(s)
account for the high levels of observed political agreement: selection, inWuence or shared interests
and preferences?
Previous attempts to address this question have often incorporated a cross-sectional sample
survey design, in which main respondents are asked to give the names, political preferences, and
other information about their own political discussion networks at a single point in time. Main
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respondent vote choice is modelled as a function of the preferences of named political discussants,
while statistically controlling for the impact of shared interests as captured by key demographic
attributes and other factors relevant to vote choice. Studies of this kind, however, cannot control
for the potential eUects of selection: it may be that respondents have chosen to discuss politics only
with others who already agree with them. Similar criticisms have also been levelled at research using
aggregated contextual information to study the impact of the broader social context on individual vote
choice (Huckfeldt, 1979; Pattie and Johnston, 2000).
Longitudinal survey data have proven more eUective at teasing apart the impact of selection and
inWuence, either alone or in combination with an experimental or quasi-experimental design. Klofstad
(2007) Vnds social inWuence may drive increased participation among college students randomly
assigned to dorms, while Nickerson (2005) Vnds evidence of spillover eUects of voter mobilization
experiments. However, neither of these studies addresses the impact of social context on partisan
preferences. Two large survey studies with a panel component isolate the impact of social inWuence,
but only amongst marital and familial dyads (Jennings and Richard, 1981; Zuckerman, Fitzgerald and
Dasovic, 2005).
This paper takes advantage of a new mult-wave election study conducted during the 2010 British
general election cycle as part of the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP). The British CCAP
includes measures of vote choice and political discussion networks on four diUerent waves of the
survey conducted over a 9 month period. We use methods that allow us to isolate the dynamic impact
of inWuence and selection during the election. We stress that our results apply only to the processes of
selection and inWuence that operate during the campaign, and therefore undoubtedly underestimate
the contribution of both process to already high levels of political agreement in discussion networks
prior to the study.
Surprisingly, we Vnd evidence that while inWuence is clearly at work to actively forge agreement
in discussion networks during the time of the study, respondents do not appear to actively select
like-minded political discussants during the 9 month period of study. Respondents with strong
partisan identities and high levels of political interest may be more likely to retain discussants with
whom they agree, but this trend is balanced by respondents with weaker partisan identities and lower
levels of political interest more like to continue discussing politics with discussants who don’t support
the same party. Also contrary to expectations, we Vnd that the family is an important source of
persistent political disagreement. While people have more disagreements with peripheral contacts,
these peripheral contacts are much more likely to drop out of the network than familial contacts.
Finally, we Vnd that political disagreement may in some cases encourage sustained interaction and
political engagement, once again contrary to previous Vndings.
2 Reaching agreement: selection and inWuence
This paper focuses on two mechanisms believed to underlie the high levels of observed political
agreement: selection and inWuence. People may select political discussion partners who already hold
similar political views. Citizens may avoid undesirable discussants, and seek out compatible ones, in
several ways. Directly, citizens may choose to associate or discuss politics only with those who share
their political views. Selection of political discussants doesn’t necessarily mean ending pre-existing
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relationships or befriending all Liberal Democrats that one meets; it can be as simple as choosing
to sit at the opposite end of the table from politically conservative Aunt Edna at family gatherings.
Indirectly, people make many other choices that shape their pool of available discussants. For example,
one might choose to live in a neighborhood or city with a reputation for being “conservative", date
only women who were opposed to abortion, or pursue an academic career in the hopes of spending
time around other liberals.
Political agreement is not likely to be the foundation of most marriages, however, let alone most
social interactions. Citizens who who don’t or can’t indirectly avoid dissent through choices of where
to live and who to marry may instead try to avoid conWict by avoiding political discussion, either
completely or at least with those who don’t share the same political views (Eliasoph, 1998; Fitton, 1973;
Mansbridge, 1980; Ulbig and Funk, 1999). In focus groups, people have reported avoiding discussion
because “people are gonna think you’re a terrible person if you don’t believe exactly what they believe”
(Conover, Searing and Crewe, 2002). Selection of political discussants may be motivated by a general
fear of revealing preferences to others who are not trusted: “I’m just not that brave” volunteered one
participant (Conover, Searing and Crewe, 2002).
Even assuming some degree of selection of friends or discussion partners on the basis of political
views, however, doesn’t preclude the possibility that people might be exposed to other views through
social interaction. Relationships can rarely be turned on and oU like a television, and it is much easier
to change channels than to change discussion topics. As (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968) point
out, it is much easier to selectively choose media exposure on the basis of political agreement than
it is to limit social relationships on the same basis, as politics often "comes up unexpectedly as a
sideline or marginal topic in casual conversation.” The authors provided numerous examples of the
pervasive nature of political discussion in everyday life, ranging from families inWuencing one another
to a waitress who switched her vote after overhearing “bits of conversation that were not intended for
her” (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968, 153).
If two people do not see eye to eye on a political issue, then there is a chance that they may
inWuence each other. One partner may introduce new information that serves to shape or change
the other’s views. Both partners may seek a middle ground or compromise position to allow them to
continue amicable discussions. Or combined social pressure may push one of the partners to a new
political position even where reasoned discussion fails.
How often is observed agreement in political discussion networks the result of inWuence, and how
often does it result from selection? In this section we outline the ways that inWuence and selection
are expected to change agreement during the course of a single election campaign. Due to the limited
time frame of the study, we cannot observe earlier events where inWuence and selection forged high
levels of pre-existing agreement in political discussion networks. However, we can observe a series
of decisions made by many individual citizens over the course of an election: decisions about both
political discussion partners and partisan support. The discussion below traces the decision process of
a single individual during the election, and identiVes critical junctures at which we can test hypotheses
derived from existing research about the mechanisms may impact individual decision-making.
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2.1 Selection
Do people talk about politics to the same people throughout a campaign, or do they more actively
select discussion partners from among those available? In our research, we Vnd that people change
who they talk to about politics (or at least remember talking to) fairly frequently during the course of a
single election campaign. Just over half (53-59%) of the discussants named in the one survey re-appear
in the following wave. What factors may aUect the likelihood of retaining discussion partners for
a longer period of time? People may select on political similarity, preferring to talk about politics
only or primarily with those who prefer the same political party (or those whose partisan leanings
are unclear.) Other aspects of the relationship, such as marital or familial ties, or shared close friends,
may increase (or decrease) the likelihood of ongoing discussions.
Selection, as noted above, can consist of both direct and indirect choices that might impact political
agreement. We may increase the availability of like-minded partners through choices of where to live,
work or marry, and/or choose to discuss politics with the friends with whom we already agree. In the
relatively short nine month campaign period under consideration, it is unlikely that many respondents
are making major decisions (e.g., changing jobs, getting married) that will aUect their pool of potential
political discussants. Therefore, we expect that selection during a campaign will take the form of
direct or active selection of discussants from amongst those available.
To identify the impact of selection on discussion networks, we will trace the hypothetical decision
process of a single citizen, whom we will call Ken. Initially, Ken names up to Vve people with whom
he discusses politics, likely the friends and family members with whom he discuss other important
matters (Klofstad, McClurg and Rolfe, 2009). Ken may Vnd that none of his discussants disagree with
him, or at least that none make their agreement known. Kenmay still name diUerent people as political
discussants during the next wave of the survey, but this change in discussants could not be attributed
to selection on the basis of political similarity.
What will happen to Ken if he runs into conWict while discussing politics? As noted above, it is
possible that he may withdraw from political discussion altogether. If he withdraws completely, we
would expect to see that either he named fewer discussants on subsequent waves of the surveys, or
that he failed to participate in those waves altogether. Prior research has shown that disagreement
can have a demobilizing eUect on political engagement (Mutz, 2002), and it stands to reason that this
might extend to actively avoiding political discussion to avoid a contentious conversation. Therefore,
the engement hypothesis is: main respondents who experience disagreement during discussion
will withdraw from political discussion or drop out of the survey.
Alternatively, Ken may continue to discuss politics, but try to avoid the people whose views are
not the same as his own. If Ken doesn’t name the discussants with whom he has an acknowledged
disagreement during subsequent survey waves, it may be that Ken is actively selecting for shared
political views. To assess the rate of selection, we will need to compare the retention rate of politically
similar discussants to those with whom the respondent does not agree. Therefore, the primary
selection hypothesis is: main respondents will be more likely to retain agreeable discussants
than disagreeable ones.
Citizens don’t only choose the people with whom they will (or won’t) discuss politics, they also
choose which newspapers to read, television channels to watch and political actors to believe. Active
selection of political messages takes place across a range of sources, including both media messages
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and political discussants. Prior research has shown people can and do actively select media sources
on the basis of political agreement (Bennett and Iyengar, 2008; Iyengar and Hahn, 2009; Stroud, 2008).
Citizens who are more engaged in politics, as well as those with stronger political identities, are
more likely to select to receive only messages from sources with which they already agree (see
also Zaller (1992)). It may be that a similar process is at work in selection of political discussion
partners, with stronger partisans and more politically engaged subjects more likely to choose to
discuss politics only with like-minded alters. This hypothesis is a modiVed version of the selection
hypothesis above, in which only citizens who care about politics and/or have strong political identities
actively select discussants.
Political agreement is not the only factor that aUects the likelihood that Ken will retain a particular
discussant in his political network, as the strength or closeness of the relationship is likely to also play
a signiVcant role. Prior evidence also suggests that strong ties are more likely than weak ties to persist
over time (Brewer, 2000; Marin, 2004). In particular, the roles of spouse and family member are by
deVnition relatively stable over time, and family members are more likely to be part of a stable core
discussion network (Morgan, Neal and Carder, 1997). Additionally, dyadic ties that are embedded in a
larger network of joint friendships are more persistent than relationships where those involved do not
share other ties in common Burt (2000); Hammer (1979). The relationship status hypothesis asserts that
relationship status will have an independent impact on discussant retention: main respondents will
be more likely to retain spouses, family members and other close ties as political discussants,
regardless of political agreement.
Disagreement and closeness, then, are expected to work in opposite directions; disagreement
decreasing the likelihood of ongoing political discussion and closeness increasing the chances that
discussion continues. But what is likely to happen when someone’s spouse or sibling support a
diUerent political party? Close ties, including spouses and family members, are generally more likely
to agree with the main respondent than other members of the network (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995;
Jacobs, Lomax Cook and Delli Carpini, 2009; Mutz and Mondak, 2006; Nieuwbeerta and Flap, 2000).
But when there is disagreement among spouses, family members or close friends, the opposing forces
may interact in distinct ways. In statistical terms, closeness of the relationship may change not only
the intercept, but also the slope of disagreement. It may be that disagreement increases discussion
in close relationships, as both people try to change the other person’s mind. Alternatively, it could
be that disagreement in close relationships is particularly objectionable, and thus discussion is more
likely to be avoided.
Existing research provides little guidance as to what we might expect in this case, and therefore we
develop several hypotheses applying the guiding insight that political discussion is risky. Perceived
risk of damage to the dyadic relationship, and the larger network in which it is embedded, may
moderate the relationship between political disagreement and the likelihood of continuing to discuss
politics.1 Focus group participants spoke of fear of the loss of social status or the esteem of others,
1This might be thought of as an additional test of two leading models of diUusion: “cohesion" (Coleman, Katz and
Menzel, 1957) vs “structural equivalence" ’ (Burt, 1987). The cohesion model is based on the assumption that closeness
of a relationship and frequency of engagement build trust and inWuence, and thus we might expect that selection out of
discussing politics with close friends, family members and spouses would be low because trust is generally higher (while
risk is lower). Burt (1987) argues that people imitate their structurally equivalent contacts because they perceive that the
act is proper for a person of their social stature. Thus, we might expect a main respondent would want to avoid discussing
politics with a peer holding inappropriate views, or a peer who might think poorly of the main respondent’s own views.
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and the fear of having someone avoid them in other settings. Even if these negative eUects do not
transpire, the fear of them can be real, and might aUect how people respond to disagreement. It
is possible that all close relationships, including spouses, family members and close friendships, are
relatively safe, in which case: all close relationships may encourage more frequent expression of
political disagreement.
Alternatively, it may be that close relationships are not all the same, marital relationships might be
felt to be a less risky dyad within which to discuss politics. If this is the case, then disagreement in a
close or safe relationships may have a diUerent impact from disagreement in a more delicate situation.
Disagreeing with spouses is likely to be comparatively safe. The relationship is highly intimate and
private, and for most couples, political disagreement is likely to be one of many discussion topics
characterised by conWict. In fact, politics may even be safer ground for regular debate than the typical
topics of disagreement such as money, sex, housework and children (Gottman, Markman and Notarius,
1977). Couples rarely, if ever, cite political squabbles as a major cause of conWict that might lead to
divorce (Gottman, Markman and Notarius, 1977). Political disagreement may increase the amount
of political discussion between spouses, as each tries to convince the other to see a diUerent point
of view.
Political discussion with family members carries a more moderate risk, as family members who
are not living together may not have other topics that provide space for underlying conWict to spill
out. On the one hand, distant family members can easily be avoided or accommodated, much like
other friends. Many of us are familiar with the caricature of the uncle who spouts on and on about
politics at the family Christmas gathering. But year after year, this uncle is invited back. On the
other hand, parents and their adult children may gravitate towards political debates as a means of
working out conWict in other areas, although there is likely to be signiVcant variation in the stability
of such relationships across the broad deVnition of family members. Therefore, it is possible that
disagreement with family members may sometimes lead to reduced discussion in the future.
Disagreement with other close ties who are neither spouse nor family member is potentially the
most fraught and delicate situation. Such relationships are clearly optional, and can be ended far
more easily than a marriage or a long-standing family time. It is far easier to replace a close friend
than it is to replace a mother or a husband. Secondly, close ties are generally embedded within a
closeknit network, with multiple shared friendships. Therefore, any fallout between close friends
is unlikely to be limited to the dyad, but will spillover and potentially fracture the larger network.
Thus, disagreement carries a large risk of aUecting the connection between the main respondent and
her other contacts as well. Therefore, disagreement may increase the likelihood that the main
respondent and discussant in close relationships will stop discussing politics (although they very
likely still remain friends.)
2.2 InWuence
Suppose, however, that some people continue to discuss politics with those who don’t hold the same
political views. Discussion and engagement with diverse viewpoints opens up the possibility of
inWuence: one person may change his or her mind as a result of new information, social pressure,
imitation of peers or some other psychological mechanism associated with making conditional choices
(Rolfe, 2009). InWuence does not Wow only from discussant to main respondent, it can also Wow the
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other direction with the result that one, two or all members of a social network may shift their
political views. However, given that we have only limited information about the large networks
within which main respondents are embedded, we will focus our discussion on situations in which
the main respondent is inWuenced (or not) by his or her discussants rather than vice versa.
How then, might we expect political disagreement to aUect the main respondent’s voting intention
during a campaign, and what other factors might also eUect a change of voting intentions? InWuence
may depend less on dyadic disagreement with a single discussant, and more on the distribution of
attitudes within the larger political discussion network. It could be that many people are conditionally
responsive to the voting decisions of others with a majority focal point (Huckfeldt, Johnson and
Sprague, 2004; Latane, 1996; Rolfe, 2009), changing views to support the political party favoured by
the majority of their discussants. Or it could be that conditional responsiveness takes on a more linear
form, with main respondents increasingly likely to switch vote choice as a greater proportion of their
friends support a diUerent candidate. Regardless of functional form, the inWuence hypothesis holds
that as disagreement in a network grows, a respondent will be more likely to change her vote
choice.
Alternatively, the likelihood of inWuence may not depend solely on the sheer number of discussants
with whom the respondent disagrees, as it may be that disagreement with particular individuals has
a disproportionate impact on vote choice. It could be that inWuence works through cohesion, with
respondents more likely to alter their decision as a result of disagreement with those to whom
he or she is particularly close, such as spouse and family members. Alternatively, it could be that
inWuence works primarily through structural equivalence (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Levine, 2005),
with respondents more likely to alter their decision as a result of disagreement with structurally
equivalent peers.
Political disagreement with network members is not the only factor that may cause people to
change their minds during the course of an election. Previous studies have identiVed two factors
in particular as important: awareness and partisan strength. Committed partisans and politically
engaged citizens will be less likely to change their vote choice than those who are less politically
aware or with a weaker political identity.
3 Data and measurement
Data for the paper comes from a longitudinal panel study of the UK general population.2 Six waves of
surveys were adminstered conducted over the internet by YouGov as part of the British Cooperative
Campaign Analysis Project (BCCAP) during the period before and after the British general elections
held on May 6, 2010. This paper uses data gathered by the Oxford/Saïd CCAP team during the Vnal
four waves: Wave 3 held just before the party conferences (September 2009), Wave 4 (January 2010),
the pre-election Wave 5 (late April 2010) and the post-election Wave 6 (early June 2010.)
In each wave, respondents were asked to provide the initials of up to Vve people with whom they
had discussed politics in the previous month. This question (or name generator) was designed to
elicit only the names recent political discussants, not a list of political discussants in general. The one
month time window is smaller than that used in previous studies of political discussion, including the
2For more on the YouGov sample and procedures, see Twyman (2008). For more on the CCAP project, see Jackman and
Vavreck (2010).
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Comparative National Election Project, the British Election Studies, the General Social Survey, and
the South Bend study. The repeated use of this name generator over a 9 month period allows us to
investigate changes in political discussion partners over time. Table 1 gives an example of how the
original data looks from the perspective of the main respondent who provided the initials of up to 5
discussants recorded during each wave of the survey.
Table 1: Data structure with main respondent as primary unit of analysis
Wave 3 Wave 4
Main Respondent ID Discussant 1 . . . Discussant 5 Discussant 1 . . . Discussant 5
1 SD . . . JT SD . . . AR
2 ML . . . PF . . .
3 HY . . . CW . . . BP
1405 respondents responded to the team portion of the initial CCAP wave, and all of those
respondents were invited to participate in each of the subsequent waves included in this analysis. Not
all respondents participated in every wave, and not all respondents who participated in a particular
wave provided valid information about at least one discussant. 1211 respondents in at least one of the
four waves, and just under a 1000 of these respondents provided network information on at least one
of the waves. A total of 1042 respondents participated in at least two of the four chosen waves, almost
three-quarters of whom (n = 738) provided valid discussant information on both of these waves.3
In order to study changes in the network, we must identify the discussants that were named
more than once by a main respondent. The provided initials of discussants were matched across
multiple waves of the study, and each unique discussant was identiVed.4 Thus, it is possible to trace
both whether a discussant was named at a later date during the election, and how the presence of
acknowledged disagreement within the dyad changes over time. The matching also allows the dataset
to be transformed to focus on the dyadic relationship between main respondents and their named
discussants, as indicated in Table 2. The transformed dataset includes 990 main respondents who
named at least one discussant, 885 of whom participated in at least two waves and 738 of whom
named discussants in at least two of the four waves. Main respondents participating in at least two
waves named an average of 6.8 unique discussants, for a total of over 5000 unique dyads recorded.5
Acknowledged disagreement
After naming up to Vve discussants, respondents were then asked to indicate characteristics of
the discussants, including whether their discussants are “likely to vote for a diUerent political party.”
Unlike the other large-scale surveys mentioned above, main respondents were not asked to indicate
speciVcally which party or candidate is supported by the named discussant. This procedure was
intended to signiVcantly reduce respondent burden (Rolfe, 2010),6 and is less error-prone than the
traditional approach. On one prior study, respondents failed to correctly identify the partisanship
of more than 30% of named discussants (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1987). However, the mistakes were
almost exclusively one-sided: respondents made overly optimistic assessments of how likely their
3Note: n = 468 respondents participated in three waves, and n = 180 participated in all four waves.
4These matches were reviewed carefully, with the Vnal match taking into account inconsistent use of initials or
capitalization (e.g., J.S. vs jbs) and inalterable characteristics of the discussants (e.g., female, family member, foreign-born).
55797 unique dyads altogether, 5418 involve respondents who participated on two or more survey waves, and 5012
involved respondents who named discussants on two or more waves.
6It was quite successful in this respect, reducing the time required to provide basic political discussion network
information from around 15 minutes to around 90 seconds on average.
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Table 2: Data structure with discussion dyad as primary unit of analysis
Discussant name Main Respondent ID Appears in wave 3 Appears in wave 4
SD 1 yes yes
JT 1 yes no
AR 1 no yes
ML 2 yes no
PF 2 yes no
HY 3 yes no
CW 3 no yes
BP 3 no yes
discussants were to support the same political party, but almost never reported that discussants
with similar preferences actually preferred a diUerent party. Thus, our measure asks only about
disagreement, which respondents do not over-estimate, but does not distinguish between agreement
and uncertainty, as respondents themselves often mistakenly assume agreement when they are
uncertain.
Another point to note is that the rate of acknowledged disagreement is expected to increase
closer to the election, as political discussion increases and party preferences solidify. Thus, aggregate
levels of acknowledged disagreement observed at a point in time are not particularly informative
about the relative impact of selection and inWuence. Increased awareness of disagreement works
against selection and inWuence, with the net result being that acknowledged disagreement levels on
average vary little over the course of the campaign. In line with previous research (Huckfeldt, Johnson
and Sprague, 2004), we Vnd that disagreement in discussion networks does not decrease during the
campaign, but characterizes between 20 and 24% of all dyads reported on each of the survey waves.
The postelection wave actually has the highest level of acknowledged political disagreement. This
does not mean that inWuence and selection are not occurring. It more likely means that there are
oppositional processes at work that mask the eUect of inWuence and selection.7 These countervailing
trends highlight the importance of using the correct techniques and model to parse out the eUects of
selection and inWuence during the campaign, a point to which we return repeatedly later in the paper.
Relationship with discussants
Respondents are also asked to indicate whether the discussant is a spouse, a family member, or
a close friend of someone else on the list.8 The spouse and family member designations are coded
as either 1 (the discussant is a spouse, or the discussant is a family member) or 0. The designation
of a “close friend of someone else on the list" might indicate that the relationship between the
respondent and named alter is particularly cohesive, as it is embedded in a larger network of ties
Hammer (1979). It might also indicate that the two individuals are structurally equivalent, or are
friends with the same people. As noted earlier, it is diXcult to disentangle the concepts of cohesion
and structural equivalence in an egocentric network, and thus we use indicators of all three types of
close relationships: marital, familial, and embedded friendships. All three relationship variables were
coded as mutually exclusive (i.e., spouses are not also family members, and neither spouses nor family
members are coded as close friends.)
7A re-analysis of Huckfeldt, Johnson and Sprague (2004)’s results using an alternative method reveals an aggregate
decrease in disagreement over time (Bello, 2011)
813% of the discussants are spouses, 28% are other family members, and 18% are good friends with someone else on the
list.
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Main respondent characteristics
Finally, the data contain important measures of main respondent characteristics collected as part
of the study. Main respondent vote choice is measured on each wave of the survey, with respondents
asked to indicate which party they plan to vote for in the coming election. Respondents who had
not yet made up their mind were asked if they were leaning towards a particular party, and this
information was also incorporated into the vote choice variable.
The binary distinction between respondents who had already decided which party they would
support and those who were merely leaning towards a party is used as the basic measure of political
identity strength. Two additional measures of strength of political identity were also collected and
used in robustness tests: strength of their partisan identiVcation (recorded on a three point scale),
and a folded ideology scale (with 5 as extreme liberal or conservative, and 0 as middle of the scale)
Iyengar and Hahn (2009). Both have been used in prior research, but the latter may not translate to
the multi-party European context.
Political engagement, like strength of political identity, may aUect both selection and inWuence.
Previous studies of similar topics have employed a variety of measures for this construct, including
education, political interest, political knowledge, and media use. While it is not appropriate to use
more than one of these indicators for a single estimate, all are available in the CCAP data. Not all
questions were asked on all survey waves. To maximize variation and minimize missing data, we use
as a primary measure on average of political interest rated by the respondent on a four point scale; a
question asked on all waves of the survey. Other measures of political engagement are used only for
tests of model robustness.
Finally, we control for the mechanical eUects of participation and network size at the individual
level. Some respondents do not name any discussants on a given wave, although this may not be
an accurate indication of whether the respondent discussed politics in the previous month (Bearman
and Parigi, 2004) Additionally, the average number of discussants named in each wave may aUect the
likelihood that a discussant is retained in the network. It may be that a discussant named by someone
with a larger network has a greater chance of re-appearing simply by chance. Alternatively, it could
be that people with larger networks are more likely to forget alters (Brewer, 2000).
Methods
The analysis of the data proceeds in three steps. First, we use a combination of descriptive statistics
and standard multiple regression (i.e., logistic regression with non-participation as the dependent
variable) to assess whether respondents who disagree with their discussants are more likely to
withdraw from political engagement, either by reducing their reported number of political discussants
or by dropping out of the survey altogether. This step also allows us to make an informed assessment
of whether survey attrition (or drop-out) is non-random in a way that is likely to bias our other results,
and informs our treatment of attrition in the remainder of the analysis.
Next, we assess the various selection hypotheses described above. Selection of political discussants
may take place in many ways, but our focus is on the active selection of political discussants during
the campaign season. Following Snijders and Bosker (1999), we investigate change in ties within
personal networks; in particular whether a discussant named by a respondent during one wave of
the survey is named in one or more subsequent waves. Analysis of the selection process uses a
transformed dataset where the unit of analysis is a unique discussant/respondent dyad, as described
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in Table 2 above.9 The analysis follows the multilevel or hierarchical modeling strategy (Snijders and
Bosker, 1999), nesting discussants (or dyads) within main respondents to account for respondent-level
variation in the likelihood of renaming discussants on multiple survey waves. The persistence of
dyadic ties (i.e., whether or not a discussant is named again on a later wave) is a binary variable,
which we model using logistic regression (Feld, Suitor and Hoegh, 2007).
Finally, a mixed eUects logistic regression is used to assess the inWuence hypotheses, with changes
in vote choice from one survey wave to the next as the dependent variable. The inWuence test follows
Kenny (1998) in using vote choice as a proxy for social inWuence, but his analysis was limited to two
points in time. Our data, however, have a more complicated structure as respondents are asked about
both discussants and vote choice at up to 4 diUerent points in time.
To understand our approach and how it diUers from prior research, it is useful to consider the
hypothetical networks of main respondent, Ken. Ken’s networks appear in Figure 1, with dark circles
representing friends of one party (e.g. Labour) and white circles represent friends who support a
diUerent party (e.g. Conservative). Thick lines between the individuals represents political agreement,
while thin lines represent disagreement. The percentage of thick lines is the percentage of agreement
in the network. Ken starts out as a Labour supporter, and three-Vfths of his network concur. This
means Ken agrees with 60% of his network. In Wave 4, Joe and Vince change their support to
the Conservative party. Now Ken agrees with just one of the Vve discussants, Ben. In the Vnal
wave, Ken changes his support to Conservative, meaning that now he agrees with 80 per cent of his
discussants—Ben is the sole remaining supporter of the Labour party in Ken’s network.
Ken
Carol Terri Joe Vince Ben
(a) Wave 3
Ken
Carol Terri Joe Vince Ben
(b) Wave 4
Ken
Carol Terri Joe Vince Ben
(c) Wave 5
Figure 1: Sample vote choice distribution in a network at three time points
What happens to disagreement in Ken’s network from wave to wave and how do these changes
relate to Ken’s own vote switch from wave 4 to wave 5? Let’s simply walk through what we observed.
Ken reports 40% disagreement in wave 3 (t = 1), 80% disagreement in wave 4 (t = 2), and only 20%
disagreement in wave 5 (t = 3). His vote choice does not change between waves 3 and 4, but does
change between waves 4 and 5.
In our models of social inWuence, the dependent variable is whether the main respondent’s vote
choice in the present (time t) diUers from that provided on the previous wave (t − 1). This model
isolates information from two subsequent waves of the survey, and allows us to assess whether
disagreement in one wave (t − 1) predicts a vote change on the following wave. Ken’s record would
consist of two unique observations: the Vrst using disagreement from wave 3 to predict vote change
between waves 3 and 4, and the second using disagreement from wave 4 to predict vote change
between waves 4 and 5. In the example above, we can see that Ken did not change his vote when
the majority of his network agreed with him, but changed it when faced with broad disagreement.
9Discussants who are named in the Vnal wave and discussants named by main respondents who only participate in one
wave of the survey have no opportunity to appear at least twice, and are therefore excluded from the analysis.
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Thus, our approach is similar to previous research (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Kenny, 1998) in
focusing on changes between only two points in time, but allows us to control for other unobserved
sources of individual variation in the propensity to switch parties.
Looking only at change in vote choice within subjects (instead of diUerences in party preference
between subjects) eliminates many issues that might arise when using cross-sectional panel data,
particularly as we look only at the binary outcome of vote switching instead of transitions to and
from one party choice to another Jackman and Vavreck (2010). However, there may still be some
unobserved factors that make some main respondents more likely to switch parties than others, and
we therefore include a term for random eUects associated with each respondent. There may also be
unobserved factors that make all respondents more likely to change their mind at certain points in
the election. Therefore, we directly incorporate the impact of time by including Vxed eUects for each
panel wave.10
4 Results: Engagement (Dropout and Network Size)
It may be that main respondents who experience political disagreement during political discussion
do not merely choose to avoid future conversations with particular discussants, but instead stop
discussing politics altogether. Previous work suggests that political conWict may have a more generally
depressing impact on political engagement and subsequent willingness to discuss politics with anyone
(Mutz, 2002). If conWict drives political disengagement, by increasing either the likelihood of survey
attrition or the likelihood of naming fewer discussants in the future, any estimates of the impact
of disagreement on selection and inWuence may be biased. Non-random survey dropout (including
intermittent cases where respondents later return to the panel) is one of the most signiVcant threats
to the use of panel data, although we Vnd no evidence that non-random is likely to be an issue in the
remainder of the analysis.
Figure 2(a) provides some basic insight into the process, describing the distribution of respondents
who disengage (either by dropping out of the survey or naming fewer discussants) conditional on the
amount of political disagreement they reported in the previous wave (none, low or high).11 ased on
respondent-level data, suggests that respondent engagement is aUected by the experience of political
disagreement with discussion partners, but that the the impact does not run in the expected direction,
nor is the impact necessarily linear.
Respondents who report no political disagreement with their discussants are on average almost
50% (9 percentage points) more likely to name fewer discussants on the following wave than those
who experience high levels of political disagreement. In other words, disagreement can encourage
sustained political discussion instead of discouraging it. Respondents who experience only moderate
levels of acknowledged disagreement (less than half of named discussants), are less likely than those
who experience either no or high levels of disagreement to name more discussants in the following
10Although it is possible that there is a time trend, linear or otherwise, we had observations from only a few points in
time and therefore the categorical approach is more suitable. Including a linear time trend decreases the explanatory power
of the model, and treating survey wave as a Vxed category outperforms a crossed random eUects model with both survey
wave and respondent.
11This measure is computed as the number of discussants who disagree divided by the total number of discussants named
on the prior wave. Respondents who name no discussants or report that no discussants disagree fall into the category none,
Rs who report that half or fewer of their discussants disagree are in the category some, while the remainder of Rs are coded
as experiencing high disagreement.
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Figure 2: The impact of disagreement on network size, attrition, and discussant retention
wave of the survey. Thus, it would appear in the simple bivariate analysis that high levels of political
disagreement actually encourage discussion relative to purely consensual political contexts, although
there is a non-linear trend and there may be a slight negative impact of more moderate levels of
disagreement.
Also reported in Figure 2(a), it is very easy to see that disagreement has no signiVcant impact on
survey drop out rate. Drop out (including intermittent drop-out) rates are relatively steady at around
20% across all levels of reported political disagreement and on all survey waves. YouGov works hard
to recruit intermittent drop-outs back into the panel for future waves, a practice that was largely
successful and that may contribute to the lack of a relationship between disagreement and future
survey participation.
No relationship between disagreement and engagement can be found even in more rigorous
multivariate tests including controls for other factors such as political interest, strength of partisanship
and demographics such as gender, age and education. There is some evidence that attrition may be
conditional on strength of political identity, as leaners are more likely to dropout of one or more
survey waves although the diUerence is only marginally signiVcant (p 0.10). However, the substantive
impact of identity strength is relatively small, with 42% of non-participants having reported that they
were only leaning towards a party in the previous round, compared to 37% of respondents who did
return for the following wave.
Finally, we checked for systematic diUerences in our ability to predict selection and inWuence (as
described in the following sections) between respondents who failed to participate in the following
survey wave and those who continued to take part. We could Vnd no diUerence in the average
residuals between the two groups of respondents, further conVrmation that estimates of the social
selection and inWuence process are unlikely to be biased by panel attrition.
5 Results: Selection
Having seen that political disagreement does not have a negative impact on the main respondent’s
level of political engagement (and may even have a positive impact on discussion network size),
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we move on to consider selection, or the impact of political disagreement on the likelihood that a
particular discussant is named on a later wave of the survey. Figure 2(b) provides basic statistics
showing the initial likelihood that a discussant has an acknowledged partisan diUerence, and
conditional on (dis)agreement, the probability that a discussant will be named more than once. Over
three-quarters of discussants do not have acknowledged disagreement with the main respondent, and
just under half of those (49%) are named as a discussant at a later date. The smaller number (22%)
of discussants who are initially acknowledged as having a diUerent partisan preference are slightly
less likely to be named at a later date (63%), although this diUerence is only borderline statistically
signiVcant. Thus, initial analysis suggests that respondents do actively select discussants who do not
disagree with them during a campaign, although the impact is relatively small, and unlikely to survive
once we control for the nature of the relationship between respondent and discussant.
However, there may be additional diUerences that contribute to this observed pattern. Perhaps
discussants who disagree with the main respondents are less likely to be close friends, and therefore
less likely to be named in the future because they are not as close to the main respondent. Or perhaps
main respondents whose friends and family disagreed with them simply dropped out of the survey,
and thus had fewer opportunities to name their discussants on other waves of the study. To control
for these other explanations, we Vrst transform the basic discussant dataset to align information on
whether the dyad appears at each of three time period, t, (i.e., waves 4, 5 and 6) with information about
whether dyadic disagreement was acknowledged during the previous time period, t − 1 (i.e., waves
3, 4 and 5). We then use a multilevel modelling strategy to account for characteristics of the dyadic
relationship and attributes of the main respondent (de Miguel Luken and Tranmer, 2010; Lubbers,
Molina, Lerner, Brandes, Ávila and McCarty, 2010; Snijders and Bosker, 1999). Results appear in Table
3.
The Vrst column of Table 3 presents results from the basic model involving no interactions.
As expected, political discussion with spouses and family members is less likely to be ended than
discussion with other friends, even close friendships. None of the political indicators, including dyadic
disagreement, had any discernible eUect on the likelihood of naming a political discussant again on
the subsequent wave of the survey however. While it is surprising to see so little evidence of selection,
this may be attributable to the relatively close nature of the relationships involved. It may also be due
to the fact that selection, even if strong, is expected to be a rare event. We only expect selection to
occur in new relations, or when a new disagreement becomes salient in an existing relationship. In
this way, we can think as networks being close to an equilibrium at any point. When it is disrupted
by small shocks like new relationships, selection can re-equilibrize the network. Therefore, we must
focus in on cases where selection is less likely to be such a rare phenomenon. We propose to take a
close look at the interactions of disagreement with both political and relationship variables to see if
there are some situations in which selection may be at work.
The middle column of the table models the interaction between relationship status and
disagreement. Are respondents more or less likely to continue discussing politics with spouses, family
members and close friends with whom they disagree? For the Vrst time, political disagreement
does have a signiVcant impact on the likelihood of selection, but in one case it is in the wrong
direction. Instead of dropping all discussants with diUerent partisan preferences, respondents clearly
discriminate among discussants based on the nature of their relationship. Respondents are more likely
14
Table 3: EUect of disagreement on the likelihood of repeated presence in the network
No interactions Dyad interactions Political interactions
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Relationship variables
Spouse 2.082* (0.131) 2.027* (0.139) 2.037* (0.14)
Family 0.919* (0.092) 0.996* (0.105) 0.997* (0.105)
Friend of others 0.228* (0.108) 0.279* (0.125) 0.271* (0.126)
Dyadic disagreement -0.062 (0.093) 0.038 (0.137) 0.513+ (0.299)
Main respondent attributes
Political interest 0.005 (0.156) -0.002 (0.156) 0.147 (0.172)
Party strength (weak) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted)
Party strength (moderate) 0.015 (0.091) 0.021 (0.091) -0.087 (0.102)
Party strength (strong) -0.025 (0.156) -0.025 (0.156) 0.009 (0.173)
Relationship interactions
Spouse*Disagreement 0.718+ (0.427) 0.764+ (0.428)
Family*Disagreement -0.373+ (0.22) -0.353 (0.22)
Friend of others*Disagreement -0.2 (0.242) -0.21 (0.243)
Political interactions
Political interest*Disagreement -0.849* (0.358)
Party strength (moderate)*Disagreement 0.536* (0.207)
Party strength (strong)*Disagreement -0.183 (0.355)
Controls
First wave discussant appears -0.544* (0.05) -0.543* (0.05) -0.546* (0.05)
Ave. number of discussants named per wave 0.39* (0.036) 0.392* (0.036) 0.397* (0.036)
Total waves main respondent participates in 0.261* (0.059) 0.263* (0.059) 0.257* (0.06)
Constant -0.915* (0.352) -0.955* (0.352) -1.016* (0.356)
Dyads 3649 3649 3649
Main respondents 723 723 723
AIC 4414 4413 4406
+SigniVcant at the 90% level
*SigniVcant at the 95% level
to continue discussing politics with spouses who hold diUerent political views when compared to
spouses who hold the same view. Spouses who do not support diUerent parties are expected to
re-appear in the network 80% of the time, while those who disagree with their partners are named
again 93% of the time. The substantive impact of relationship status on the possibility of retention is
graphically presented in Figure 3, based on predicted probabilities from the third and Vnal selection
model
Respondents are less like to continue discussing politics with other family members who
support an opposing party, but the substantive impact is small: 58% of family members with an
acknowledged disagreement are retained vs 61% of those who agree. The estimated substantive impact
of disagreement within close relationship is about twice as large as that for family members (40% vs.
47%), however the impact is not statistically signiVcant even in a relatively large sample. This suggests
that respondents may not respond as uniformly to disagreement in close friendships; with some
respondents treating close friends more like partners and others responding as if disagreement with
close friends was more like disagreement with family members. Overall, it appears that respondents
continue to discuss politics with close friends, spouses and family members, regardless of whether or
not they disagree with them. Optimistically, this suggests that people may enjoy and pursue political
discussion involving disagreement when it is a relatively safe topic of conversation.
The Vnal column of of Table 3 presents results from a model involving political interactions, with
the substantive eUects appearing in Figure 3. Are respondents who are more political engaged or
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Figure 3: Impact of relationship status and individual political attributes on discussant retention
committed more willing and able to select like-minded discussants? The answer is a fairly strong yes:
strong partisans with high levels of political interest are more likely to retain political discussants with
whom they agree. On their own, political engagement and political identity strength continue to have
no independent impact on the likelihood of retaining discussants. However, both political attributes
of the main respondent work in combination to aUect the selection of discussants based on whether
or not they disagree with the main respondent.
The impact of the most potent combination in favour of selection is fairly substantial: a strong
partisan with high political interest who disagrees with a weak-tie discussant is predicted to have
a 26% chance of naming that discussant later, as compared to a 38% chance if he or she did not
acknowledged a disagreement with the same discussant. At last, we Vnd clear evidence that people do
select discussants based on political preferences. However, there is a major caveat: not all respondents
select for political agreement. Instead, many respondents appear to select for political disagreement,
and are actually more likely to retain discussants with whom they disagree. Fairly strong (moderate)
partisan supporters are more likely to retain discussants with whom they disagree. Moderate partisans
with no or low political interest are estimated to be almost twice as likely to retain a discussant with
whom they disagree as opposed to one with whom they agree (57% vs. 32% and 51% vs. 33%).
Overall, we Vnd some evidence of selection, but our analysis reaXrms the need for additional work
in this area. More broadly, these Vndings call into question previous work Vnding that disagreement
is most common among peripheral contacts, like co-workers (Mutz and Mondak, 2006). Faas and
Schmitt-Beck (2010, 110) concludes:
By discussing politics with family or friends, people can weave themselves into a
protective cocoon where their views tend to be conVrmed rather than challenged. Quite
the contrary is the case for secondary relations: discussing politics more often with
co-workers or neighbors leads to intensiVed experiences of disagreement.
Strictly speaking, these claims are true. At any given moment, people are more likely to agree
with close friends and family than with more peripheral contacts. But a single snapshot of political
discussion obscures the nature of political discussion over time, and the important role played by core
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Figure 4: Sources of overall and persistent disagreement in political discussion networks
network members in the maintenance of democratic diversity and disagreement. Close friends and
family are the overwhelming source of persistent disagreement in political networks. Even though
family members are less likely to disagree, they are more likely to re-appear in the network over time.
Figure 4 breaks down sources of disagreement among all discussants named at least once, and
compares this to sources of disagreement among discussants who are named more than once.
Non-family contacts make up 70% of unique discussants who disagree with the main respondent, and
weak tie friendships comprise almost half of all discussants with an acknowledged disagreement. Now,
compare this to the sources of persistent disagreement, or disagreement with contacts that appear in
the discussion network more than once. Family contacts are the single largest source of persistent
disagreement, with the combined categories of souse and family comprising over 40% of discussants
who disagree with the respondent yet are still named more than once. Spouses comprise only 7% of
all discussants who disagree at any given point, but over 15% of persistent discussants who disagree
with the main respondent. Meanwhile, weak tie friendships are the source of persistent disagreements
in less than 40% of all cases, largely because weak ties are less likely to be retained as active political
discussants.
6 Results: InWuence
Moving on, we consider what happens to main respondents who are exposed to political disagreement:
does exposure to disagreement increase the chances of the main respondent changing his or her vote
choice? If respondents who are exposed to disagreement are more likely to switch parties, all else
being equal, this would substantiate claims that friends and family members may inWuence each
other’s political choices. Our analysis of the inWuence process uses the dataset where the unit of
analysis is a single main respondent interviewed on more than one occasion, as described in Table 1
above.12 These data are then transformed to align the party choice of the respondent at time t (waves
12Main respondents who only participate in one wave of the survey have no opportunity to change their mind and are
therefore excluded from the analysis.
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4, 5 and 6), with respondent party choice, network disagreement and political identity strength at time
t− 1 (waves 3, 4 and 5).13
Are respondent’s who report that they disagree with one or more of their discussants more likely
to change their vote choice at a later point in time? Approximately 1 in 4 respondents changed their
vote choice during the study.14 Respondents who reported at least some disagreement in their political
networks at any point in time were more likely to switch party than those who never reported any
disagreement (28% vs. 21.5%). However, this statistic does not take into account the temporal nature
of social inWuence, as inWuence requires that disagreement come before vote change and not after.
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Figure 5: Change in respondent vote choice following experience of disagreement
The temporal nature of inWuence is partially addressed by Figure 5, describing what proportion
of respondents change their vote between one wave (at time t) and the following wave (at time
t + 1), dependent on the number of discussants they named with whom they had an acknowledged
disagreement in the Vrst time period (t). As can be seen, respondents who claim to have already
decided who they will support in the election are less likely to change their minds than respondents
who indicate they are merely leaning towards one party or the other. Nonetheless, even decided
voters are more likely to change their vote choice when facing high levels of political disagreement,
while leaning voters facing both moderate and high levels of disgreement are more likeliy to switch
parties. On average across both decided and leaning voters, respondents who report high levels
of disagreement with their discussants are signiVcantly more likely to switch party choice in the
following period than respondents who report no disagreement with their discussants (11% vs. 16%).
Also noteworthy is the fact that indecisive respondents (i.e., those who do not indicate which party
they are leaning towards) who do not disagree with any of their discussants are more likely than those
who do not agree with one or more of their discussants to have made a deVnite party choice by the
next survey wave.
13All results were also checked for robustness to inclusion of respondents who intermittently dropped out of Wave 4 or
Wave 5 and then returned the following wave are also included, with change assessed between the two waves participated
in (i.e., changes between Waves 3 and 5 or Waves 4 and 6.)
14Including only respondents who participate in at least two waves of the survey; party switchers are those who indicate
an intention to vote for a particular party, or who indicate that they are leaning towards a particular party, and later indicate
a diUerent party.
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Table 4: Models of Party Switching
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Main respondent attributes
Political interest 1.15* (0.48) 0.82+ (0.47) 0.50 (0.52)
Leaning voter 1.78** (0.22) 1.74** (0.22) 1.57** (0.25)
Political network attributes
Prior wave network disagreement (0-1) 2.72* (1.12) 0.38 (1.77)
Prior wave network disagreement2 -2.58* (1.27) -2.75* (1.32)
Interaction terms
Interest * Disagreement 2.88 (1.85)
Leaner * Disagreement 1.11 (0.72)
Survey Wave
Wave 5 Pre-Election 0.61** (0.22) 0.65** (0.22) 0.66** (0.22)
Wave 6 Post-Election 0.60* (0.24) 0.59* (0.24) 0.59* (0.25)
Constant -5.06** (0.40) -4.92** (0.38) -4.72** (0.41)
Random EUects
Std. Dev. Std. Error Std. Dev. Std. Error
Main Respondents 4.29 2.07 3.75 1.94 4.2 2.00
n=961 n=957 n=957
AIC 1460 1438 1437
n 2152 2128 2128
+SigniVcant at the 90% level
*SigniVcant at the 95% level
**SigniVcant at the 99% level
This simple relationship may be misleading, however, as it does not take into account other factors
such as political engagement and political identity strength that may also aUect the likelihood that
a respondent changes his or vote choice prior to the election. Table 4 provides estimates of three
versions of the social inWuence model controlling for other factors that may be important . The Vrst
model, in the far left column, simply conVrms that the typical predictors of vote switching do perform
as expected. Committed partisans are far less likely to switch their vote choice than respondents
who are only leaning towards a particular party. After taking political identity strength into account,
however, political engagement increases (rather than decreases) the probability that a respondent will
support a diUerent party on the next wave of the survey.
Does political discussion also impact vote choice, with disagreement increasing the probability of
switching parties? The middle column of Table 4 addresses this question, incorporating a non-linear
speciVcation of prior wave network disagreement. Respondents who report having one or more
discussants who hold diUerent partisan preferences on one wave of the survey are clearly more likely
to switch the vote choice by the next wave of the survey. This eUect is not a strictly linear response to
the proportion of discussants who disagree with the respondent, but peaks around the majority focal
point of 50% disagreement.15
Are some respondents more resistant to inWuence than others, or does disagreement aUect all
respondents in the same way? This question is taken up by the third model in Table 4, and the answer
is a resounding yes. The third model incorporates interaction terms between political disagreement
and political engagement and identity commitment, and both interaction terms are positive. Politically
engaged respondents are more likely to shift their party choice in response to disagreement with
discussants than those who are less interested in politics. Furthermore, less politically committed
15Comparisons of the two disagreement response functions conVrm that that the non-linear speciVcation is preferable.
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Figure 6: Impact of disagreement and individual political attributes on vote switching
respondents who are only leaning one direction or the other are also more inWuenced by their
discussants than stronger partisans. Disagreement actually strengthens the resolve of respondents
who are strongly committed to their party of choice, or those who are not particularly interested in
politics anyway. Political interest no longer has a signiVcant independent impact on party switching
once we account for how interest mediates the impact of social inWuence and disagreement.
These results are strong support for the operation of social inWuence on political attitudes and
vote choice, even during the short time span of the 9 month period leading up to an election. The
experience of disagreement in political discussion networks drives some people to change their views
to eliminate that disagreement. The social inWuence process can be observed even after accounting for
the main respondent’s own level of political engagement and commitment, and is particularly strong
among those with less Vrm political identities and high levels of political interest.
7 Conclusion
When we started this paper, we expected to Vnd that both selection and inWuence contributed to
forging agreement during the months prior to an election. We were aware from the beginning
that our exclusive focus on the dynamic operation of inWuence and selection during the 9 month
period prior to an election was likely to vastly underestimate the prevalence of both processes in
the co-evolution of political opinions and political discussion networks. Nonetheless, the results in
this paper have surprised us, and call into question several aspects of the conventional wisdom about
political disagreement, selection and inWuence.
We expected to Vnd that selection and inWuence were both contributing to agreement in political
discussion networks, but were able to Vnd at best limited evidence that people selected discussion
partners based on political preferences. Using a novel data collection, we were able to isolate the
process of social inWuence on vote choice, and conVrmed that people can inWuence each other during
the campaign season. These data were also used to isolate the process of selection of like-minded
discussants (Ulbig and Funk, 1999), but the results were quite unexpected. People did not choose
political discussion partners based on political considerations, they instead chose to discuss politics
20
more frequently with their spouses, close friends and family members.
Strikingly, we found that political disagreement within some close relationships actually
encouraged sustained political discussion instead of squelching it. As a result, spouses and family
members contribute far more to exposure to sustained disagreement with political discussants than
would be suggested by a cross-sectional survey. Workplace discussion may be the most frequent
source of disagreement at any single point in time (Mutz, 2002), but such studies may miss the crucial
insight that political disagreements in close relationships are persistent and encourage high levels
of political discussion. Yes people in the workplace and other peripheral contacts are more likely
to disagree with the main respondent, but they are much more likely to drop out of the network as
well. The value of disagreement in these ties is not to be understated. Thus, we Vnd that political
disagreement with spouses and intimates is actually the primary source of persistent disagreement.
Our Vndings also call into question the previously reported relationship between disagreement
and participation. It may be possible to reconcile these diUerences, however, by recognizing that
we employ a unique measure of political disagreement. Many studies ask respondents about more
general perceptions of conWict and disagreement in political conversation, opening up the possibility
that a general sense of fear and ineXcacy might color reported levels of disagreement. As noted
earlier, political discussion is often felt to be dangerous. In a democratic society, political discussion
and debate is a ritual that is intended to take the place of more violent forms of war and conWict.
Psychologists have found that people in weaker positions are more likely to perceive conWict, and
also to avoid discussion and interaction with more powerful people Fiske and Apret (1996). Thus, it
isn’t particularly surprising that subjective perceptions of conWict and participation are negatively
related. Our measure, however, is better suited to avoiding this issue of tapping into subjective
conWict perceptions by asking only about acknowledged partisan disagreement. More research is
needed to fully explore the relationship, and assess more fully whether objective measures of political
disagreement have a uniformly demobilising impact.
Finally, there is little doubt that people are inWuencing one another during the campaign. A
respondent and a discussant who have a disagreement acknowledged at one point in time are
highly likely to eliminate that disagreement at a later point. Approximately a fourth of the time,
disagreements are eliminated when a respondent switches parties. While main respondents are likely
overestimating their own impact on their discussants, there is nonetheless a clear case to be made for
social inWuence running in both directions.
Perhaps surprisingly, the net result of all the individual-level inWuence we observed is not
increased levels of political agreement at the aggregate level, however. As soon as disagreement in
one dyad is eliminated, new disagreements emerge and become acknowledged. It appears that social
inWuence may contribute a great deal towards the forging of agreement in discussion networks, but
neither selection nor inWuence eliminates exposure to political disagreement in close relationships
during the campaign season.
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